Providing Aviation Weather Services to the Federal Aviation Administration
Opening Statement By Chairman Brad Miller
Good morning.
This subcommittee has frequently struggled with the peculiar nonchalance of some government agencies in the face of that obvious dysfunction of critical programs. Today we struggle with the equally peculiar determination by the FAA to solve a problem that appears not to exist, to fix what ain’t broke.
The current system for delivering aviation weather products for air traffic control appears to work pretty well. For thirty years, the National Weather Service (NWS) has provided support to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) through aviation weather forecast units that are located at each of the twenty-one regional air traffic centers. There are 84 forecasters spread among those 21 centers offering 16 hours of service each day at an annual cost of $12 million; the system appears to be lean and well suited to air traffic controllers’ needs.
In 2006, Booz, Allen, Hamilton conducted a survey of air traffic controllers at seven of the regional air traffic centers under a contract with the FAA. Their conclusion was apparently not what FAA probably wanted to hear. Booz, Allen found the air traffic controllers’ “have a strong desire to have on-site” weather forecasters and that they “considered the services of the ... meteorologists highly valuable and expressed sensitivity to any actions that might terminate or severely alter the delivery method of these services.”
This weather forecasting supports—by the FAA’s own calculations—a one trillion dollar aviation industry. Currently, the FAA is spending approximately $1 billion a year on NextGen development, so the $12 million for aviation weather forecasting that the FAA pays the NWS seems like a bargain.
Still, FAA has been pushing the NWS to consolidate their aviation weather service to a single center since 2005. The FAA’s determination to force the NWS to reorganize does not appear supported by any evidence of a significant problems with the current system that cannot be addressed within that system, or any evidence that there is substantial waste in the current system. FAA’s determination appears not supported by any evidence that a consolidated system would provide better service, or even service as good as what the NWS now provides. Again, air traffic controllers like the NWS’ service just fine and don’t want to change it.
GAO concludes that the FAA settled on a solution for reorganizing aviation weather services before they could clearly articulate their own requirements for these services, and before they had given any thought to how to measure existing performance—in other words, FAA decided on a solution before they figured out if they had a problem. Only since the last GAO report of 2008 has the FAA and the National Weather Service begun to develop performance metrics for the aviation weather units. Now, for the first time, an exercise is finally underway by FAA and NWS to baseline the performance of the existing units—though these “baselines” are built on impressionistic interviews rather than a steady aggregation of hard performance numbers.
We all support performance-based decision making and a commitment to continuous improvement—two slogans that the FAA likes to intone—but the reality is that performance-based decision making requires meaningful, rigorous performance metrics. The FAA doesn’t have those, but has already determined that a new organization structure is needed.
The FAA likes to claim that this consolidation will provide a solid platform to transition to the NextGen air management system. However, they have not included NextGen’s weather planning office in the discussion about requirements for the NWS or in the evaluation of any of the proposed reorganizations.
The Federal Aviation Administration has claimed that consolidation will save at least $2 million, but those savings can only come through reducing the number of weather forecasters who are dedicated to supporting the needs of aviation.
Ultimately, the FAA has pushed for a plan to consolidate aviation weather services, that does not respond to a clearly articulated need or problem, and would change a system that has air traffic controllers’ full support. A shift in how services are delivered will cost money to test and, if adopted, will create new risks that don’t exist in the current system. Perhaps that will result in a greater “mass” of expertise in one place, but the down-sizing of the staff will leave each forecaster responsible for more air space, and deprives air traffic controllers of a forecaster to stand over their shoulder in a weather crisis.
In preparing for this hearing, the Subcommittee gathered information from the FAA, the NWS, the National Transportation Safety Board, the air traffic controllers union, the weather service employees union and the Government Accountability Office. We also received the witnesses’ testimony in recent days. The point of the FAA’s exercise is hard to understand.
Witnesses
Panel
0 - Mr. David Powner
Director Information Technology Management Issues Government Accountability Office Information Technology Management Issues Government Accountability Office
Download the Witness Testimony
0 - Dr. Jack Hayes
Assistant Administrator National Weather Service National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration National Weather Service National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin
Download the Witness Testimony
0 - Mr. Richard Day
Senior Vice President for Operations Air Traffic Organization Federal Aviation Administration Air Traffic Organization Federal Aviation Administration
Download the Witness Testimony