Setting New Courses for Polar Weather Satellites and Earth Observations

Opening Statement By Chairman Brad Miller

Since 2003, there have been seven hearings before the Science and Technology Committee or its subcommittees on the subject of the National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program.  Established in 1994, the program was intended to design, develop, construct and launch satellites into polar orbits so that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and Department of Defense (DOD) would continue to receive daily data necessary for civilian and military weather forecasting needs. 

In the 2003 hearing, the life-cycle cost for NPOESS in the March 2003 budget request was $6.1 billion, with the first of six satellites expected to be launched in 2009.  In last year's hearing, the life-cycle cost estimate had grown to at least $14.9 billion, was intended to purchase only four satellites with a first NPOESS satellite launch pushed back to 2014. 

NPOESS suffered from major performance problems and schedule delays for the primary imaging instrument and these spawned cost overruns.  However, the real problem with the program was that it was crippled by a management structure that delayed decisions at critical moments.  The tri-agency management board proved incapable of making decisions and taking action when most needed.  Last year, witnesses testified before this Subcommittee that program leadership had deteriorated to the point that only White House intervention would assure that there would ever be any NPOESS satellites at all.  At that hearing, we were told that one agency should be put in charge of managing the program—either DOD or NOAA. 

OSTP did take responsibility for intervening to rescue this drifting program.  However, instead of putting just one agency in charge, OSTP adopted the Solomanic solution of cutting the program in two.  Satellites flying in orbits to collect early-morning observations would be developed and launched by DOD with their newly-christened Defense Weather Satellite System.  NOAA would do the same with their renamed Joint Polar Satellite System to collect observations in the afternoon.  NOAA would operate all the satellites while in orbit, and would manage the common data system to receive, store and share all data. 

With its decision, OSTP has removed the block over which we've been stumbling for the past few years.  This does not guarantee success.  There was a reason for having a single program in the first place, and splitting the program in two may simply create two new programs with the same problems.  There are plenty of reasons to keep attention fixed on these new programs.  For example, even though we now have clarity about what agency is responsible for which mission, this clarity comes at the cost of delay and confusion about which instruments will be flown on what satellite and when will the satellite launch?  There is a contractor that still has continuing work for the old NPOESS program, and subcontractors with instruments in various states of development—what is to be the fate of those work efforts and when will those decisions be made? 

Our other discussion today grows out of our experience with NPOESS.  Back in 2006, all of the climate sensors being prepared to fly on NPOESS were removed.  If we anticipate having to deal with climate change for decades to come, how can we eliminate a means of knowing how well we are doing?  It has been clear that this decision was ill-thought through and would have to be reversed.  Without these sensors, or similar capabilities, our ability to strengthen our Earth observation networks as a whole will be compromised.  We asked GAO to examine the current state of the strategy for gathering necessary climate data.  GAO's answer is that we don't have one, at least not a comprehensive strategy.  This will be a subject that we hope the administration witnesses can shed some light upon.

We have spent almost $6 billion already on the NPOESS program.  There is not a single completed satellite to show for the time and money. We do however have two signs that read, “now under new management”.  I know it is the hope of everyone here, that this new management will be the solution to what has ailed the NPOESS program.

Witnesses

Panel

1 - Hon. Shere B. Abbott
Associate Director for Environment Office of Science and Technology Policy Executive Office of the President of the United States Office of Science and Technolo
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2 - Ms. Mary M. Glackin
Deputy Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration U.S. Department of Commerce National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad
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3 - Mr. Christopher J. Scolese
Associate Administrator National Aeronautics and Space Administration National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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4 - Mr. Gil Klinger
Director, Space & Intelligence Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for A
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5 - Mr. David A. Powner
Director, Information Technology United States Government Accountability Office United States Government Accountability Office
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