The Science of Security: Lessons Learned in Developing, Testing and Operating Advanced Radiation Monitors

Opening Statement By Chairman Brad Miller

In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, preventing the detonation of a nuclear or radiological device in the U.S. has become a top national security objective.

We have invested billions of dollars since 9/11 to develop the means to prevent, detect and respond to any attack by weapons of mass destruction. We have deployed radiation monitors at our ports and border crossings to screen millions of cargo containers entering the U.S. every year, hunting for radiological material that could be used for terrorist purposes. Since 2004, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has spent more than $230 million on a program to develop a new radiation detection system called an Advanced Spectroscopic Portal or ASP that can both detect and identify nuclear material.

Congress expects that the funding federal agencies receive will be well spent. When it comes to scientifically challenging or technically demanding programs, studies have shown that it pays to have well-prepared program requirements, demanding testing protocols and an independent and comprehensive cost benefit analysis. These vital program components help managers make informed decisions about whether to move forward with a technology development program, or to replace a proven technology with a new technology. Unfortunately, despite some recent progress, the ASP program has suffered because it lacked all the preparatory steps of a well managed program. We will hear about some of those problems today from both Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the National Academies of Science.

Over the past three years the GAO has released six reports on the ASP program. The GAO found that some of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s (DNDO) tests were “biased” and did not provide a rigorous assessment of the ASP’s capabilities. The agency relied on “incomplete” and “unreliable” data in their cost-benefit analysis—omitting critical test data, inflating the costs of the current radiation detectors, and underestimating the costs of ASP monitors. The Department failed to produce a requirements document or adequate documentation regarding major changes to their planned ASP deployment strategy. DNDO never considered the option of investing in improvements to the existing radiation portal monitoring program—both the current polyvinyl toluene (PVT) monitors and the hand-held detectors Customs and Border Protection agents rely upon.

The National Academy of Sciences’ interim report on the ASP program, released yesterday, reflects many of the same concerns. The Academy calls for a significant restructuring of DHS testing procedures for the ASP program, they question the criteria being used to judge the ASP’s performance and they recommend that DHS not proceed with further ASP procurement until they address all of the findings and recommendations in their report.

GAO’s reports have provided a regular accounting of how the ASP program was going wrong; the Academy’s report provides a road-map to how the program could be put back on track—assuming that the Department determines that is worth the cost and effort.

Radioactive materials have become a normal part of commerce. They are used for medical procedures and industrial applications. Technology can help us detect and identify radioactive sources in cargo containers, but no technology can sort out “good” radioactive material intended for legitimate purposes from the “bad” radioactive material intended to do us harm. As a result, human operators will need to make important decisions, often informed by intelligence efforts, to keep the nation secure. Well trained, well equipped people--law enforcement officers and customs and border protection inspectors—will always be critical to the equation.

This hearing addresses our responsibility to the technological part of that equation. Before we move forward with a 2 to 3 billion dollar program we must ensure that we get our money’s worth from the new technology. Put another way, if we have two or three billion dollars to spend to enhance our security, is this technology really how we should spend it?

I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses today.

Witnesses

Panel 1

1 - Mr. Gene Aloise
Director Natural Resources and Environment Government Accountability Office Natural Resources and Environment Government Accountability Office
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2 - Dr. Micah Lowenthal
Division on Earth and Life Studies Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board National Research Council Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board National Research Council
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Panel 2

1 - Dr. William Hagan
Acting Deputy Director Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) Department of Hom
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2 - Mr. Todd C. Owen
Acting Deputy Assistant Commissioner Office of Field Operations U.S. Customs & Border Protection (CBP) Office of Field Operations U.S. Customs & Border Protecti
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