The Science of Security Part II: Technical Problems Continue to Hinder Advanced Radiation Monitors
Opening Statement By Chairman Brad Miller
Soon after the September 11 attacks, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) began operating radiation portal monitors to screen cargo entering the United States for radiological or nuclear material. They have purchased approximately 1500 polyvinyl toluene (PVT) monitors and deployed them at ports and border crossings throughout the United States.
PVTs indicate the presence of a radiation source, but they cannot identify the nature of the source. As a result, any cargo container that provokes a warning from a PVT is then sent to a “secondary” inspection where Customs officers use other technology and information to determine what sort of material is in the container. There are plenty of innocent sources of radiation—from kitty litter to medical isotopes—and many of these secondary inspections can be handled quickly. However, some secondary inspections require that the container be opened, and even emptied, in the search for a source. While this is time consuming, the PVT seems to be working well to meet Customs’ dual mission to keep us safe while maintaining a steady flow of commerce.
The Department of Homeland Security has been developing a new radiation portal monitor, championed by the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), that advocates believe should replace the PVTs. This new monitor—the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal monitor or ASP—would detect the presence of radiation in cargo, but it would also identify the type of radiation. This would allow more harmless cargo to pass unimpeded through the port and require far-fewer secondary referrals. If it worked as advertised, the ASPs would be more likely to identify highly enriched uranium and other materials of concern and enhance the flow of commerce while freeing up Customs officers to tend to other duties besides secondary inspections.
Despite a $230 million investment of taxpayer dollars for development, the ASPs haven’t performed as expected, and the results from recent field tests are worrisome. Last June we learned of problems in the first field test of February 2009. At our June hearing we heard that those issues had been fixed and that the July field test would allow the Department to move towards a cost-benefit analysis and certification decision for the Secretary. To date, we have seen neither.
The July field test highlighted yet another problem with the ASPs: the devices detected nuclear materials when none were present.
The ASPs had numerous false positive hits for special nuclear material in July—each one of which would have resulted in the implementation of mandated security responses by Customs, potentially shutting down port operations. Fortunately, Customs was also running the PVTs (which properly saw no radiation present) and cleared up the issue in secondary.
DNDO has told our staff that they intend to fix this new problem by changing the sensitivity of the ASPs to detecting uranium, but it isn’t clear that should be reassuring. If you lower the sensitivity to the very materials the ASP was supposed to be better at detecting, why would the ASP will still be better than PVTs at detecting those materials? Would you have to go back to the Nevada Test Site to prove that you can still detect levels of special nuclear material more accurately than the PVTs can?
Second, if the machines detect special nuclear material where it doesn’t exist, why should changing the sensitivity make any difference at all? Detecting ghost isotopes is a problem with the operating system itself, not with the sensitivity level for a particular isotope.
Since the taxpayers have spent $200,000 for each of the 1,500 PVTs already deployed, the case for ASPs, which will run approximately $800,000 per unit -- for a total cost of $2-3 billion -- needs to be clear both in terms of better detection performance and better support for Customs operations. Add to this greater acquisition cost, an annual operating expense of ASPs that is at least five times more expensive per unit than PVTs, and the need for a convincing case is even greater. As it stands, it is hard to see why ASPs should be more than a secondary inspection tool.
In fact, that is the role they play in the Department of Energy’s Megaport program. DOE already runs a program that inspects cargo leaving 27 major foreign ports for destinations anywhere in the world. DOE, which developed portal radiation detection technology, uses PVTs for primary inspection and reserves ASPs for secondary inspections to help identify the type of isotope to which the PVT responded. The Department of Energy’s approach to identifying radiation should be instructive to DHS.
I want to thank our witnesses for attending today. I particularly want to thank GAO for their continuing work on this matter and for their continuing assistance to this Committee and Congress. I suspect that this will not be the last time we gather on this subject, nor the last time we hear from witnesses that we still face a long list of tests and validations before we can even speak sensibly about replacing PVTs with ASPs.
Witnesses
Panel
1 - Mr. Gene Aloise
Director Natural Resources and Environment Government Accountability Office (GAO) Natural Resources and Environment Government Accountability Office (GAO)
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4 - Dr. William Hagan
Acting Deputy Director Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) Department of Hom
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3 - Mr. Todd Owen
Executive Director Cargo and Conveyance Security Office of Field Operations Cargo and Conveyance Security Office of Field Operations
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2 - Dr. Timothy M. Persons
Chief Scientist Government Accountability Office (GAO) Government Accountability Office (GAO)