Transitioning the Environmental Measurements Laboratory at the Department of Homeland Security

Opening Statement By Chairman Brad Miller

Good morning. We learned from Hurricane Katrina that we were woefully unprepared for an entirely foreseeable natural disaster. The failures of our response exposed the sorry state of our emergency preparedness.

Many of us wondered what else was suffering from similar neglect that we might only learn of if something else goes horribly wrong.

Today, the Subcommittee is going to review management of the Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML) by the Department of Homeland Security’s Science & Technology Directorate. It appears that we have stunningly neglected our obvious national security and homeland security need to detect and measure radiation, hindering our ability to respond to nuclear proliferation around the world, and here in the United States to prevent or respond to the detonation of a “dirty bomb,” a punch that terrorist groups have telegraphed for years. And while we are spending billions to develop the technology to intercept a missile in the air, we have shortchanged research to develop the technology to prevent a nuclear device from being smuggled into the United States and detonated in an American city, a far more likely event.

EML has specialized in radiation detection and analysis for 60 years. It traces its roots to the Manhattan Project. It should have been a welcomed asset and natural fit for an agency charged with protecting the country from radiological threats. Instead, detailed plans to close the lab were concealed from both the EML staff and Congress, critical national security programs at the lab were terminated and the lab’s employees have been left to ponder their future fate for the past four years without any clear direction or decisions from DHS.

When the Environmental Measurements Laboratory was transferred to Homeland Security from the Department of Energy in 2003, Congress expected that the laboratory would add value. Beginning with their work on the Manhattan Project, EML’s scientists developed a world renowned expertise in low-level radiation measurement, a skill that would be of critical value to both help prevent and respond to a potential radiological or nuclear terrorist attack. But, instead of exploiting and expanding the unique skills and capabilities of the laboratory and its strategic location in New York City, Homeland Security’s S&T Directorate soon proceeded to reject the lab’s proposals for future work and terminated its existing programs.

S&T managers downplayed, dismissed and disparaged the capabilities of the lab arguing that it had no unique skills, had low credibility in the view of the local first responders it worked with and could not compete with other larger national laboratories. Our first panel today is composed of local, state and federal officials and a former DHS program manager. They will provide a contrary view to that assessment.

We will also examine some of EML’s key programs that were inexplicably terminated. One of those was the lab’s worldwide radiation monitoring program. Beginning in 1963, EML had built a global network of low-level radiation sensors that was used by scientists to validate global atmospheric transport models. But the system also played a key role in nuclear non-proliferation efforts, rapidly identifying any new sources of radiological activities from nuclear weapons tests. The lab had installed two radiation monitors in China in 2002 and had plans to install a new detector in China near the North Korean border in early 2006. But on October 1, 2005, the program was terminated by DHS. Almost exactly a year later, on October 9, 2006, North Korea carried out a nuclear weapons test. It is hard to know how valuable the EML global monitoring program and particularly its new radiation sensor that the lab had planned to install near the North Korean border would have been in helping to determine the sophistication of the North Korean nuclear test. We only know that, because of DHS’s actions, the sensor was not in place and sits unassembled at EML today.

In 2005, DHS also stripped EML of its radioisotope chemical analysis labs critical for the continuation of its radiochemistry Quality Assessment Program (QAP) praised by both state and federal participants as directly contributing to homeland security efforts. This program helped ensure that the results produced by radiochemistry labs – whose task is to analyze radioactive samples whether from a nuclear facility or in response to a radiological attack – are accurate. Some projects EML initiated with local first responders in New York City, including a network of roof-top radiation sensors, were halted by DHS. Other programs were started, stopped and then transferred.

The incomprehensible way the Environmental Measurements Laboratory has fared since being transferred to DHS is testimony to an appalling lack of leadership at the S&T Directorate. The lack of clear decisions and direction regarding EML permitted a haphazard approach to the EML and its programs to fester within the S&T Directorate. As a result, the lab’s programs were decimated and its staff demoralized with a seemingly reckless disregard for how the lab’s skills and projects could have benefited DHS, other federal agencies or the Nation as a whole. Top S&T managers responsible for terminating some of the lab’s key programs had no idea what these programs actually did and held no discussions on how they might benefit DHS. In addition, S&T managers squandered an inordinate amount of time and effort planning for the demise of the Environmental Measurements Laboratory rather than attempting to determine how the lab could be effectively utilized and its staff successfully employed to contribute to DHS.

Because of all of these actions, the lab has been left in a disturbing state of limbo. Many of its programs have been terminated, new projects halted, the skills and capabilities of its federal employees disparaged and its staff reduced by one-third. The Subcommittee hopes that the EML and the leadership at the S&T Directorate have finally turned the corner and that we can expect positive change to be forthcoming.

Our last panel will look towards the lab’s future role in DHS. The vast majority of these actions did not occur under Undersecretary of Science & Technology, Admiral Cohen’s watch. The Subcommittee is pleased that the new leadership at the S&T Directorate appears willing to utilize a laboratory that many have referred to as a national asset. We anticipate that the S&T Directorate and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office will work together to fully employ and exploit the skills of the staff at the Environmental Measurements Laboratory.

Witnesses

Panel 1

3 - Ms. Lynn Albin
Radiation Health Physicist Office of Radiation Protection, Department of Health State of Washington Office of Radiation Protection, Department of Health State o
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1 - Charles F. McBrearty
Former Director of Material Technology Air Force Technical Applications Center Air Force Technical Applications Center
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2 - Dr. Tony Fainberg
Former Program Manager of Radiological & Nuclear Countermeasures Office of Research and Development, Science & Technology Directorate Department of Homeland Sec
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4 - Jonathan A. Duecker
Assistant Commissioner, Counterterrorism Bureau New York Police Department New York Police Department
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Panel 2

1 - John F. Clarke
Deputy Director, Office of National Laboratories Science & Technology Directorate Department of Homeland Security Science & Technology Directorate Department of
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Panel 3

1 - Admiral Jay M. Cohen
Undersecretary for Science and Technology Department of Homeland Security Department of Homeland Security
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2 - Vayl Oxford
Director Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Department of Homeland Security Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Department of Homeland Security
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