GAO Issues Report on Mismanaging Critical Isotopes and the Energy Department’s Role in the Helium-3 Crisis
(Washington, DC) -- The Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report yesterday on the government’s flawed management of critical isotopes, particularly Helium-3, a non-radioactive gas that plays a crucial role in the fields of nuclear security, scientific and medical research, and the oil and gas industries. The report was requested by Congressman Brad Miller, Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Energy & Environment and Ms. Donna F. Edwards, Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Investigations & Oversight. The GAO report found that the Department of Energy’s lack of accountability and management of its Isotope Program was a recipe for failure in the past, regarding the He-3 supply crisis, and that unless these problems are acknowledged and fixed they could be a recipe for failure in the future.
Last year the I&O Subcommittee, under then-Chairman Miller, held a hearing on the Helium-3 supply shortage and issued a staff report, “Caught By Surprise: Causes and Consequences of the Helium-3 Supply Crisis,” https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg57170/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg57170.pdf, that echoed the GAO findings. “Those in charge of producing and selling He-3 knew or should have known that the demand [for Helium-3 gas] was going up exponentially while the supply was declining,” the staff report said. “Those who developed technologies that relied completely on He-3 should also have determined whether there was a dependable supply of He-3 for the next 15 years before investing hundreds of millions of dollars in those technologies. None of them can or should be excused from their role in bringing this crisis into being and wasting taxpayer dollars,” the report concluded.
The GAO investigation discovered that the Department of Energy was forecasting the demand for Helium-3 by tracking the number of telephone inquiries its Isotope Program office received requesting He-3 gas. In 2008, the year DOE became aware of the impending He-3 supply crisis, the office received nine telephone inquiries for 1,226 liters of He-3 gas. In reality, the demand for He-3 gas in 2008, the GAO revealed, was nearly 60,000 liters.
“The Department of Energy was in charge of managing the supply of Helium-3, and apparently did not think to check how much they had and what the needs were,” said Mr. Miller, Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Energy & Environment and former Chairman of the Subcommittee on Investigations & Oversight. “No one using Helium-3 knew they needed a “plan B” until they learned with little warning that there wasn’t enough. The Department of Homeland Security was planning to spend billions of dollars developing nuclear security technologies that required Helium-3 and had no clue that the supply was almost gone.”
“Gross mismanagement at the Department of Energy led to a global Helium-3 supply crisis that jeopardized U.S. nuclear security programs, the global oil and gas industry, and billion dollar international scientific projects,” said Ms. Donna F. Edwards, Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Investigations & Oversight. “DOE has a responsibility to anticipate demand for the critical isotopes they produce or distribute to ensure availability when the nation needs them. With so much riding on Helium-3, it is shocking to learn that the Department’s forecast for demand is based simply on a telephone log tracking those who called asking about the availability of Helium-3.”
Despite these vivid management failures identified by the GAO, the Department of Energy seems unwilling or unable to recognize these failures and may be doomed to repeat these mistakes in the future as a result. The pivotal cause of the Helium-3 crisis was the fact that the DOE’s Isotope Program claimed it only had responsibility for distributing He-3, but not managing the supply of He-3 because it is “extracted” by the DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), and the Isotope Program did not control its production. There are 17 isotopes, including Helium-3, the Isotope Program sells to the public but does not control. Among those isotopes is lithium-6, a key component in battery research, for instance.
Surprisingly, in response to the GAO report, DOE wrote that its Isotope Program office “does not have the mission to be the steward of stockpiles of legacy materials and their byproducts.” Given DOE’s internal confusion over its management responsibilities regarding the nation’s isotope supplies, Mr. Miller and Ms. Edwards have requested that GAO take a broader look at the management of DOE’s Isotope Program to ensure the program is better prepared to anticipate and avoid future demand and supply surprises.
GAO-11-472: MANAGING CRITICAL ISOTOPES: Weaknesses in DOE's Management of Helium-3 Delayed the Federal Response to a Critical Supply Shortage, https://www.gao.gov/Products/GAO-11-472
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