Ranking Member Lofgren Floor Statement for the Record On Consideration of Moolenaar Amendment #830 to H.R. 3838
For eight years, the Science Committee has taken great care in balancing the many competing priorities in the research security space – openness versus risk aversion, taking threats seriously while incentivizing voluntary disclosures, and, of course, navigating partisan differences. By and large, we have been extremely successful in getting to agreement, passing constructive policies, examining implementation, and updating those policies based on input from stakeholders. It is with that near-decade of experience in this space that I strongly object to this amendment.
In negotiations for research security provisions in past NDAAs and in CHIPS & Science, we went to great lengths to codify – or to direct agencies to determine – what qualifies as prohibited conduct, what constitutes a foreign entity of concern, what must be disclosed to agencies, and more. The SAFE Research Act ignores, and sometimes entirely contradicts, what has already been passed into law. This amendment assumes that, by default, any recipient of U.S. grant money should cut all ties with all collaborators “affiliated with” a “hostile foreign entity.” The amendment defines “affiliation” as an “affiliation, partnership, or other research or teaching relationship.” Of course, defining “affiliation” as “affiliation” is extremely unhelpful to science agencies who will be responsible for implementing this prohibition, as well as to researchers who must determine what to disclose to the government. Furthermore, prohibiting a “teaching relationship” directly contradicts exemptions made in CHIPS & Science. As recently as this past spring, we worked in a bipartisan fashion to clarify the CHIPS & Science definition of “malign foreign talent recruitment program,” responding to stakeholders’ concern that the definition was unclear and that it was unhelpful to refer to ever-changing lists of entities. Now, the SAFE Research Act refers to a dozen different lists to define “hostile foreign entity.” I urge Representative Moolenaar to review existing legislation and update this amendment to ensure that it does not create further confusion for agencies, institutions, and researchers.
Beyond these inconsistencies with existing law, the so-called SAFE Research Act would enact extreme, excessive prohibitions that would do far more to damage American competitiveness than it would to protect us from foreign adversaries. This bill reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the scientific enterprise. Not all research poses the same level of risk to national security if disclosed to foreign adversaries. In fact, a lot of research poses absolutely no risk to research security. Basic research is meant to be published. This means that the vast majority of grants issued by our federal science agencies is funding research that China can read about in academic journals, just like everyone else. Prohibiting collaboration with researchers from foreign countries of concern serves only to shut our own eyes and prevent ourselves from benefitting from the scientific expertise of our competitors. This is foolish. This will make us dumber, and it won’t make us safer.
While such draconian prohibitions on collaboration are a gift to our adversaries, they are a true nightmare for American researchers. The SAFE Research Act proposes that its policies apply retroactively to researchers’ last five years of work. The list of activities subject to disclosure includes items as banal as participating in conferences “affiliated” with a foreign adversary country (with no specificity as to what “participation” entails), and as basic as “professorship” (does this include teaching an undergraduate foreign national?). A “teaching relationship” from four years ago can, under this amendment’s provisions, disqualify a researcher from federal grant funding. It is deeply unfair – and completely ineffective – to prohibit conduct, let alone benign conduct, that predates the passing of the legislation itself. Since 2018, we have made great progress in aligning the fundamentally different worldviews of researchers and of the intelligence community. True cooperation to address real threats to research security is not possible without this common understanding. But the SAFE Research Act takes an enormous step back, making routine activities seem nefarious and likely terrifying researchers whose disclosures and compliance are absolutely necessary to confront real threats.
If this amendment were to become law, it defies belief that the federal government could even implement its provisions. Federal science agencies are still in the process of implementing and harmonizing provisions of already-passed laws, and this implementation has become all the more difficult due to the ongoing reductions in force, staff departures, and reorganizations spurred by this administration. This amendment creates even more work for agencies – not only to implement the more extreme measures, but to navigate how to rectify any conflict between these provisions and existing law. Our federal research agencies simply do not have the capacity to review five-year lookbacks of researchers’ every interaction with collaborators who may be affiliated with “hostile foreign entities.” The fact that these additional provisions will do nothing to protect national security simply adds insult to injury.
I cannot overstate the amount of work that has gone into ensuring that Science Committee legislation on research security is bipartisan and incorporates the needs and concerns of the myriad stakeholders involved. Reviewing the SAFE Research Act has put that into even starker relief. It is imperative that work on this topic be much better researched, better negotiated, and better suited to address actual problems, rather than political aims.
We should reject this amendment.
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